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A demand based theory of sub-national debt bailouts is presented.
It is shown that revenue sharing (RS) arrangements alter the demand
for bailouts among politicians with regional constituencies as a bailout
usually implies a shift of taxation to the federal tier. Automatic RS
may lead to the formation of pro-bailout coalitions formed by indebted
states and states that are net recipients of the RS arrangement. Also,
RS can act as a commitment device for compensating payments among
state representatives, making a bailout politically rational. The model
shows that the state debt bailouts approved by the Brazilian Senate
prior to the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Act were fully
consistent with politicians that maximize the proceeds accruing to
their constituencies.
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1 Introduction
A number of countries have undergone several rounds of bailouts of subna-
tional government debts in the last decade. The Brazilian government, for
instance, assumed the debts of the federated states in 1989, 1993 and 1997.
Also in its southern neighbor, Argentina, the line that separates provincial
and federal budgets has become blurred a number of times. Seven provinces
were granted a debt bailout between 1992 and 1994 and the central govern-
ment took over deficit-ridden public pension funds of 11 provinces between
1994 and 1996. Bailout operations also occurred in 1995 and 2001. Such
operations are not always explicit however, and, in some instances, hyper-
inflation may have been the ultimate bailout that eroded debt stocks. 1 2
While bailouts of subnational entities could be eﬃcient ex post, the above
mentioned recurrence of episodes could undermine eﬀorts of the center to
achieve fiscal discipline.
1An indication in this direction is the fact that the total deficit of Mexican states has
exceeded the sum of increases in indebtness and changes in liquid assets for each and every
year since 1989 (Giugale et al.(2001)).
2Bailouts are not restricted to the developing world. Section 105 of the Australian
Constitution explicitly gives the Parliament the prerrogative to assume state debts. State
liabilities were in fact centralized in 1927, when the Loan Council was established (Courch-
ene (1999)). In Germany, the Länder of Saarland and Bremen had a bailout commanded
by the Constitutional Court in 1992. Seitz (1999) argues that the Länder were too small
to fail, in the sense that their political support was cheap given their political over repre-
sentation.
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In an attempt to strengthen the credibility of budget separations between
the diﬀerent tiers of government, several countries have changed the institu-
tional setting for subnational borrowing in the last years. After the financial
meltdown at the end of 2001, Argentina’s Congress approved a law contain-
ing a commitment to the creation of a federal fiscal body and coordination
mechanisms for provincial indebtness. 3 Brazil and Mexico have enacted
legislation containing explicit no bailout provisions. 4
This paper explores the interrelation between bailouts of subnational gov-
ernments and Constitutional tax revenue sharing arrangements (henceforth
RS). It argues that RS mechanisms, that have typically been engraved into
Constitutions, might change incentives for demand driven bailouts and pos-
sibly widen political support for bailout to units that have little to gain from
the direct transfer of debt. A subnational debt bailout implies that, unless
the federal government has the flexibility and willingness to cut back on its
expenditures to fully absorb the cost, taxation is shifted from the state to the
national level. When the Constitution mandates that a fraction of federal
revenues be automatically distributed to the states, federal revenues must be
increased by more than the stock of debts shifted to the Union. These excess
revenues accrue to member states according to the formula set in the Con-
3Article 7 of Ley 25.570, enacted on May 3rd, 2002.
4Brazil’s Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal, enacted in 2000, precluded any further credit
operation between units of the federation. State banks were also privatized or had their
credit relations with subnational governments curtailed. Brazilian states are now required
to submit new bond issuances to the sequential approval of the Ministry of Finance and
the Senate. Golden rule limits of indebtness for states and municipalities were defined.
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stitution acting as side payments conditioned on a bailout being approved.
As transfers are a direct function of federal revenues, states with low debts -
that would naturally oppose a shift of the repayment burden of subnational
sovereign debt to the central government - might not do so, as this shift ul-
timately increases their source of income. Hence, in the presence of federal
RS, a debt/GDP distribution that is skewed to the right is no longer a sine
qua non condition for a bailout to be supported by a majority of states.
The reason a bailout occurs then is not driven by an externality arising from
financial market interdependencies (as in Inman(2003)), but from the fact
that the failure to bailout indebted states generates a negative externality on
states that are net recipients of the revenue-sharing arrangement. Politicians
of remote states that have constituencies which rely heavily on transfers of
a pre-determined share of federal revenues will probably not oppose mea-
sures that increase ’the size of the pot’. Therefore policies and institutional
arrangements aimed at reducing regional income disparities should be care-
fully designed so as to not soften perceived budget constraints.
The implications of the model go well beyond Latin American federa-
tions. Rodden(2003a) gives an account of the failed attempt of a group of
US states to shift its debts to the central government in the early 1840s.
He concludes that ..., one of the best explanations for the defeat of the as-
sumption movement may simply be in the numbers-the majority of states did
not have large debts, and outside of Maryland and Pennsylvania, most of the
4
debtor states had small populations. With no constitutional RS mechanism,
the interested parties may have found themselves unable to set up the sizable
compensations to less indebted states that would have been needed to make
the proposal politically feasible (see Wibbels(2003) for a detailed discussion
of the episode). The issue should also be of interest to European policymak-
ers seeking to setup an institutional arrangement that makes the no-bailout
provision in the Constitution of the European Central Bank time-consistent.
Relation to the literature
This study relates to a growing body of literature that links fiscal insti-
tutions to fiscal performance. An interesting set of studies can be found in
the Poterba and von Hagen(1999) volume. However, the formal treatments
have chosen to treat the bailout issue as being separate from tax RS arrange-
ments. This is hardly surprising given that in most OECD countries the rules
for national RS are suﬃciently complex by themselves. I shall refer to each
strand of the literature in turn.
The literature on soft budget constraints has developed drawing heavily
on experiences of (formerly) centrally planned economies. A comprehensive
survey of this literature can be found in Kornai et al.(2003). Within this
strand, Qian and Roland(1998) studied the problem of bailouts in a fed-
eration with three types of agents: entrepreneurs, local governments and
the central government. Their model highlights the role of fiscal compe-
tition among subnational governments in hardening budget constraints for
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entrepreneurs. An accommodating central government controlling monetary
policy may react to the strategic underprovision of public goods by local
governments with money creation and distribution of seigniorage. In their
model, however, a bailout is extended by the central government even if n−1
federation units would lose from it, i.e., the political incentives for providing
a bailout are not considered.
Another strand of the literature has analyzed interregional transfers in
federations. Boadway and Flatters(1982) provide a discussion of the eq-
uity and eﬃciency aspects of a tax equalization system. Although in many
countries the primary motivation for RS seems to be based on equity consid-
erations, most of the literature highlights its potential for eﬃciency gains via
risk sharing (Persson and Tabellini(1996a), Bucovetsky(1998), Aronsson and
Wikström(2003) among others). However, as Persson and Tabellini(1996b)
point out, risk-sharing may not be perfectly separable from redistributive as-
pects if fiscal instruments are limited. Also Dixit and Londegran(1998) have
looked at redistributive aspects at play within a federation.
The aim of this study is to explore the intersection of these two strands.
Specifically, we look at the bailout problem in an economy with federal tax
RS, finding that the mechanism aﬀects the outcome in important ways. The
eﬀects of federal RS on borrowing are analysed in the absence of a credible
no-bailout commitment and on the credibility of such a pledge itself. The
credibility is endogenously conditioned by the demand for such action among
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federation units. An application of the theory to the institutional setup
of the Brazilian federation is shown. It is shown that the revenue-sharing
mechanism engraved in the 1988 Constitution was a suﬃcient condition for
the successive approvals of generalized debt bailouts in the Federal Senate.
Outline
Section 2 presents a model where even benevolent politicians with subna-
tional constituencies may decide to transfer state debts to the federal level
by a simple majority vote. The eﬀects of this expectation on borrowing are
analyzed. Furthermore, the conditions for a pro-default vote for each state
are nailed down, highlighting the eﬀect of the RS mechanism. Section 3 pro-
vides a brief overview of the federal tax RS arrangement in Brazil and a brief
account of the negotiations leading to the comprehensive Brazilian bailout of
state debts in 1997. Section 4 shows that the model can explain the approval
of the bailout operations by the Brazilian Senate in 1989, 1993 and 1997 in
spite of the fact that the vast majority of states would be net losers if one
looked only at the direct transfers of debt that were involved in the first and
the latter case. Section 5 shows that the predictions are robust to a number
of changes in specification and discusses where alternative explanations are
unsatisfactory. The paper closes with a brief discussion of the implications
and directions for further research.
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2 A Model with Bailout Risk
2.1 The Model
The purpose of this section is to provide an analytical model in which politi-
cal actors with state level constituencies have a decisive role in the provision
of a bailout. Specifically, it is assumed that the decision to extend a bailout
is taken by a simple majority vote by state governors. This may be seen
as an approximation of agreements reached within the informal forum of a
governor meeting or a Senate, where each state/province has the same num-
ber of representatives. As Senators and Governors have the same political
constituency their interests are likely to overlap to a great extent. In the case
of Brazil, to which I will refer in the empirical section, any decision involving
state debts has to be approved by the Federal Senate.
Consider a two-period economy in which a federal government, henceforth
called the Union, and n states coexist. The utility function of the governor
(or, alternatively, the representative citizen) is assumed to be (weakly) con-
cave in consumption.
The governor of province i thus maximizes the welfare function u(ci1) +
βEu(ci2), where cit represents the consumption of state i at time t and β the
rate at which future utility is weighted. In each period, state i receives a
state specific endowment yit, which is taken from an ergodic distribution rep-
resented by F [y, y]. In period 1, states may issue bi2 one period non-contingent
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bonds that are promises to repay 1 unit in period 2 in a competitive credit
market at a price q (which is just the inverse of the gross market interest
rate). The number of bonds issued is such that it does not exceed the low-
est endowment y. Bonds are redeemed with the proceeds accruing from a
proportional taxation on the endowment in period 2. Taxation might be
either federal (in which case the rate is represented by τ) or state specific
(τ i). It is important to stress that it is not important in the model whether
proceeds from debt issuance are transferred to the population of the state or
not. There is no debt at the beginning of period 1.
Assume that a share μ of national revenues are pooled in a tax sharing
fund. State i has a claim on a fixed share, denoted σi, of the fund, wherePn
i=1 σ
i = 1. In period 2, states may have a window of opportunity to shift
their liabilities to the federal level as long as it is approved by a binding
simple majority referendum among state governors. The occurrence or not
of this window of opportunity is determined by exogenous factors. All that
is known in period 1 is that it occurs with probability π. Hence, a perfectly
credible ex ante no bailout commitment is represented by the particular case
where π = 0.
The timing within a period is as follows
- nature determines the realization of endowments for each state;
- (in period 2 only) a binding referendum to decide whether state debts
will be shifted to the Union or not occurs with probability π;
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- endowments are taxed and outstanding debt and transfers are paid out;
- (in period 1 only) bonds are issued;
- consumption takes place.
2.2 (Soft) Budget Constraints
Let the binary variable z be an indicator of whether there is a bailout in
period 2. The Union’s expenditures are given by the possible repayment of
bonds taken over from states and transfers to states that are a direct function
of federal revenues. Its revenues accrue from the levy of a uniform tax rate
τ 2 on output. Hence its budget constraint in period 2 will be given by
z
Ã
nX
i=1
bi2 +
nX
j=1
σjμτ 2
nX
i=1
yi2
!
= zτ 2
nX
i=1
yi2
If there is no bailout forthcoming in period 2 the left hand side is zero and
the Union has no reason to tax, hence the federal tax rate will be zero. Also,
if a bailout is forthcoming the RS fund implies that the Union can only use
a fraction (1− μ) of the tax proceeds to honor its debts. 5
By its turn, in period 2 state i will collect state specific taxes over its
endowment at the rate τ i2 if and only if debts are not transferred to the
federal level. Thus, its budget constraint is (1− z) bi2 = (1 − z)τ i2yi2. Note
that μ does not appear in the subnational budget constraints as RS does not
apply for state specific taxes. In period 2 individuals pay state and federal
5To see this note that the above expression can be rewritten as z
Pn
i=1 b
i
2 =
z (1− μ) τ2
Pn
i=1 y
i
2.
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taxes on their incomes and receive transfers. Hence, their consumption in
period 2 will be given by ci2 = (1− zτ 2 − (1− z)τ i2) yi2+σiμτ 2
Pn
i=1 y
i
2. Since
the economy is starting with no debts, there are no taxes in the first period.
This is to say that consumption in period 1 is given by ci1 = yi1 + qbi2, where
q represents the price at which bonds were sold.
2.3 The Optimal Borrowing Strategy
Let λ denote the prior probability of a bailout happening in period 2 (that
will itself be a function of π). λ is taken as parametric since one governor
alone cannot aﬀect the outcome. In period 1, a state governor solves
max
bi2
u
¡
yi1 + qb
i
2
¢
+(1− λ)βEu
£¡
1− τ i2
¢
yi2
¤
+λβEu
"
(1− τ 2) yi2 + σiμτ 2
nX
i=1
yi2
#
, knowing that taxes are determined by the local and national budget con-
straints. To derive predictions on period 1 state borrowing, we need to specify
the utility function. One possibility is to use the quadratic utility function
u(ct) = ct − γ2c2t where 0 ≤ γ <
1
ct
so that the utility function is (weakly)
concave in the relevant range. Note that only the results of this subsection
hinge on this specific functional form.
Under risk neutrality (γ = 0) we have
sgn
∙
∂Ui
∂bi
¸
= sgn
∙
1−E
∙
yi2Pn
i=1 y
i
2
¸
− μ
¡
1− σi
¢
+
(1− μ) (q − β)
βλ
¸
If there are no risk premia q equals β so that the last term is eliminated. In the
absence of RS (i.e. when μ = 0) the derivative is necessarily positive as the
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first term in the expression on the right hand side is less than 1 and all risk-
neutral states will borrow up to their credit ceiling. This is the manifestation
of the well known common-pool problem, as the window of opportunity for
bailouts diminishes the eﬀective cost of borrowing. RS could revert the sign
of the derivative for large states, reducing their optimal level of borrowing.
For this to be the case μ has to be suﬃciently high and the participation rate
of the state in the RS fund, σi, is small. Under this conditions the costs of
borrowing for state i are raised as a bailout would impose the extra burden
of side payments to states that are beneficiaries of the RS fund.
What predictions can be derived in the more realistic case when state
governors are risk averse? Substituting the quadratic utility function in the
first order condition and assuming that y2 is i.i.d., so that E
Pn
i=1 y
i
2 = nEy,
we find that the optimal amount of borrowing in period 1 is given by an
expression that includes the degree of risk-aversion. 6 In the particular case
where an ex ante no bailout commitment is perceived as credible (λ = 0) and
q = β, the amount of borrowing reduces to
bi2 = (1 + β)
−1 £Ey − yi1¤
In other words, the amount borrowed will be a function of the steepness of
6
bi2 =
C − qyi1 + βλ
³
1
n−σ
iμ
1−μ
´2
E
P
j 6=i b
j
2
q2 + β − βλ
µ
1−
³
1
n−σiμ
1−μ
´2¶ (1)
, where C is the constant C = qγ − β
³
1
γ −Ey
´³
1− λ
³
1−
1
n−σ
iμ
1−μ
´´
. The degree of risk
aversion clearly aﬀects the amount that is borrowed.
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the expected income profile and the patience of the state. States expecting
a high growth rate and impatient states borrow more. 7 Moreover, when the
no-bailout commitment is perceived as credible, RS has no eﬀect on state
borrowing.
If the promise not to bailout is not credible however (λ > 0), the situation
changes: from the optimal borrowing expression we can conclude that state
borrowing will be aﬀected by the participation of the state in the RS mecha-
nism (σi). Also note that in contrast to the risk neutral case, state borrowing
now also depends on expected aggregate borrowing. The expectation of a
bailout in period 2 generates two eﬀects: a common-pool problem that puts
upward pressure on the amount borrowed and a contention eﬀect that comes
from the fact that states anticipate that they might have to bear the burden
of other states in case of a bailout.
2.4 To Bailout or Not to Bailout
In the previous subsection we took the prior probability of a bailout (λ) as
parametric. We now endogeneize it. Note that here we do not need to specify
the utility function. Rational state governors in period 1 know that in period
2 each benevolent governor will prefer z such that (1− zτ 2 − (1− z) τ i2) yi2+
zσiμτ 2
Pn
i=1 y
i
2 is maximized. After plugging in the budget constraints for
the two levels of government we find that the optimal strategy will be to
7Note that if the condition q = β is relaxed, borrowing will also be a function of the
relative risk aversion in the case where λ = 0.
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favor a bailout if and only if the condition below is expected to be satisfied:
bi2
yi2
>
1− μRi
1− μ
Pn
i=1 b
i
2Pn
i=1 y
i
2
(2)
where Ri denotes the state-specific representation ratio Ri = σ
i
yi2/
?n
i=1 y
i
2
. Ac-
cording to this expression, demand for a bailout comes from states with a
relatively high indebtness and a high participation rate in the distribution
of federal revenues relative to their share in expected income. Once μ has
been set (written in the Constitution) and overall subnational indebtness is
known, the above expression says that these two state specific statistics are
suﬃcient to define the optimal vote of a state. Note that states with a repre-
sentation ratio exceeding 1/μ would support debt bailouts even if they had
no debt!
It is easy to see that, in the absence of RS, expression (2) reduces to
bi2
yi2
>
Pn
i=1 b
i
2Pn
i=1 y
i
2
, so that a governor votes for a bailout if and only if the relative indebtness of
his state is above average. In other words, without RS, a bailout would only
occur if borrowing states are in majority and the debt/GDP distribution is
skewed to the right (i.e., the median is to the right of the mean). Furthermore,
from (2) one sees that a governors’ demand for a bailout increases if there is
RS (μ > 0) and his share in it exceeds his participation in expected income.
It is noteworthy that there are two aspects making bailout uncertain,
so that small states are not automatically led to borrow up to their credit
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ceiling in period 1. First, there is the risk of there being no window of
opportunity to shift debts to the federal tier in period 2. This possibility
could for instance be a function of the varying political clout of a central
government that has an interest in avoiding bailouts. Second, even if the
window of opportunity does occur in period 2, there is the possibility that
the expected distribution of the tax base is such that a bailout proposal
would be rejected by a simple majority vote. Hence, it is straightforward
that the endogenous prior probability of a bailout, λ, will be given by the
product of the probability of a referendum occurring, π, by the probability
that condition (2) will be expected to be satisfied in more than half of the
n states. As bi2 and σi are already given at the beginning of period 2, the
occurrence of a bailout will critically depend on the expected distribution
of income (the tax base) in period 2. The following sections discuss the
applicability of this stylized model to the case of the Brazilian federation.
3 Taking the Model to the Data: Revenue
Sharing and Debt Bailouts in the Brazilian
Federation
Since RS is the central piece of the paper, a few lines on its implementation
should be worthwhile. After having set up a federal RS mechanism in its
1967 Constitution, the Brazilian federation re-assured transfers mainly to its
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poorer regions by writing the rules of the transfers of federal revenues to
the states in its 1988 Constitution. 44% of the revenues of the income and
the industrial product tax go to a fund where 85% are earmarked for states
and municipalities of the relatively poorer North, Northeast and Midwestern
regions. Within each group, the share of each state is defined by a formula
based on per capita GDP, population and area. Tax revenues in Brazil exceed
38% of GDP and state governments respond for 54% of public consumption.
8
Following the enactment of the 1988 Constitution, local governments
found themselves spending increasing shares of their budget on wage and pen-
sion bills. The majority of states soon found themselves in financial straits.
They knocked on the same door as they had in the previous situations of fi-
nancial distress in 1989 and 1993. Initially the central government responded
by extending a credit line to the financially distressed states through one of
its financial institutions. This proved to be a short term solution though. In
April 1996, 25 state governors, with heterogeneous agendas, went to Brasília
to request the renegotiation of their debts. The initial response of the central
government to a general bailout was negative. Eventually the central govern-
ment did engage in talks with the most indebted states and several Senators
and Governors of poorer states voiced their demand for a generalization of
8Wage bills of public servants are the largest component of state budgets. The ap-
proval of Leviathanic constitutions by democratically elected legislatures could easily be
rationalized within the framework of a principal-agent model in which the agent obtains
disproportionate benefits from a large budget.
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the bailout. Pressure grew six months later when Governors met, this time
in São Paulo, and threatened to bypass the Ministry of Finance and take the
issue directly to the Senate, where they expected to obtain more concession-
ary terms. The central government eventually gave in, throwing its weight
on long term fiscal adjustment, the compliance with golden rules and reining
in the activities of state banks. This set the stage for a major institutional
overhaul that culminated with the enactment of the Lei de Responsabilidade
Fiscal in 2000.
Agreement protocols were signed by the states and the Ministry of Fi-
nance throughout 1997. However, the Brazilian Constitution mandates that
the Federal Senate shall "establish total limits and conditions for the entire
amount of the debt of the states, the Federal District and the municipalities"
(Article 52, §IX). In fact, Governors had been eager to remind the federal
government of the Senate’s jurisdiction over the issue at a very early stage.
Therefore, the agreements required the Senate’s approval as well as the ap-
proval of state legislatures to be sanctioned. The protocols typically estab-
lished that the Union would swap the state’s obligations for a 30 year loan
made to the state by the National Treasury at a subsidized rate. Assets to
be privatized by states were given as guarantees. Bevilaqua(2000) computes
that the 1989, 1993 and 1997 bailout operations amounted to respectively
10.5, 39.4 and 89.3 bn Reais at December 1998 values (1 US$ = 1.23 R$).
Under the agreement protocols states would also commit to comply with fis-
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cal targets that would later be incorporated in the Lei de Responsabilidade
Fiscal. The state of São Paulo held 59% of the debt to be renegotiated and
was therefore widely perceived as the pivotal case.
After six months going back and forth between the Senate’s floor and its
Comissão de Assuntos Econômicos, the agreement allowing the state of São
Paulo to renegotiate its debt with the Union was approved in November 1997
by acclamation, setting the precedent for other states that would follow. Two
Senators however recorded their dissent from the bill in the Federal Senate.
4 Politically Rational Bailouts
Due to space limits I shall constrain myself to discussing the data of the
1997 bailout. It is important to note, however, that the same state-specific
statistics that are used to analyze this case would also have predicted the
approval of the two previous generalized bailouts in 1989 and 1993 (Table 1).
Furthermore, the episodes of 1989 and 1997 would not have been approved
by Senators, had they not taken the eﬀects of bailouts that are channeled
through the RS mechanism into account.
The accumulation of debts leading to the 1997 bailout was not driven
by market forces: a Constitutional Amendment that had been approved in
1993 restricted new borrowing. The amendment prohibited the issuance of
new state bonds until 1999, with the major exception of bonds issued to pay
judicial claims. Other limitations on new debts were also introduced by the
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Central Bank in 1993 and 1994 (for a detailed account see Bevilaqua(2000)).
As the debt levels were being driven by exogenous factors as the high interest
rates and the ruling of courts, and the amount of borrowing hinges on the
unobservable degree of risk aversion of governors - the analysis will focus on
the decision to extend a bailout taking debt stocks as given. Figure 1 shows
that in the case of Argentina, where such borrowing restrictions were not in
place, there is indeed a significant positive relation between the participation
of provinces in the RS fund and the amount of borrowing.
The key expression is the bailout vote condition given by equation (2).
In other words, once we have the overall state indebtness as a fraction of the
aggregate tax base and the share of federal taxes that goes to the RS fund,
μ, the optimal voting strategy for a representative maximizing the welfare
of state i will be completely determined by the debt to tax base ratio of
the state and its expected share in the RS fund relative to its share in the
national tax base. The latter is referred to as the representation ratio.
To analyze the 1997 bailout only state debts that were eﬀectively renego-
tiated are considered. They represented over 90% of outstanding state debts
at the time and were equivalent to 10.3% of GDP. To estimate μ I considered
that in 1996, 18.8 billion Reais were pooled in the participation fund of states
and municipalities. Federal revenues in the same year reached 91.7 billion
Reais net of contributions to social security and FGTS, a state managed
severance payment fund whose contributions are linked to wages. Based on
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this, the approximate share of federal taxes that were pooled into the RS
fund was 20.49%. While this share is well below the 56.66% in the case of
the Argentine federation, it is larger than for instance Canada’s equalization
system that involves only 6% of the federal budget. 9
Figure 2 gives a scatter plot of proxies for the two state specific statistics
mentioned above. The largest states of the federation were also the most
indebted ones. In the model, y is meant to capture taxable rather than total
income. The states’ contribution to federal revenues in 1996 is used to obtain
the representation ratio (which is projected on the horizontal axis). States
with a ratio below 1 are under represented in the fund while states with a
ratio above unity are over represented (i.e. are net beneficiaries of the RS
mechanism).
Taking the cross sectional picture in 1996, we are implicitly making the
assumption that state politicians did not expect a major regional reshuﬄe of
the tax base relative to the prevailing situation at the time. The contribution
shares to federal revenues increased for only five states: the Federal District
(64.1%), Roraima (16%), Paraná (9.3%), Rio de Janeiro (5.7%) and Amapá
(4.5%). It turns out that the changes in the period following the bailout were
insuﬃcient to change the picture presented in Figures 2.
The horizontal dotted lines in Figure 2 represent the average renegotiated
9The interested reader is referred to Saiegh and Tommasi (1998), that provide an
account of the gradual increase of the fraction of federal revenues that automatically
accrue to provinces according to the fixed shares written in the Ley de Coparticipaciones.
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debt/state GDP in the respective federations. 10 In the absence of RS,
states below the dotted line would lose from a generalized bailout. As a
bailout required the approval of politicians with subnational constituencies,
a general bailout would have seemed extremely unlikely in 1997, as it would
only have been supported by three states. RS brings a new dimension into
the analysis. Using the estimates of μ and overall state indebtness we obtain
the diagonal indiﬀerence line of Figure 2. Only states within the triangle
formed by the intercepts of this line and the origin are predicted to oppose
a generalized bailout. Instead of 24 out of 27 states opposing a bailout, as
would have been the prediction in the absence of RS, there are only 7 states
that are net losers from a bailout. These 7 states together held only 25.9% of
the seats in Senate, 27.9% of the seats in the Lower Chamber and 26.5% of
the total population. The theoretical prediction then is that the bill should
easily pass in the Federal Senate. Table 1 shows that this was also the case
in the generalized bailouts of 1989 and 1993.
Judging from statements of Senators, there seems to be an understand-
ing that there is little to gain in the chamber from casting a dissenting vote
in measures that favour other states of the federation when the outcome is
clear. 11 Nevertheless, two Senators did express their negative votes during
10Note that it is not important if the debt is immediately redeemed by the federal
government. Any subsidy proportional to the renegotiated amount implies nothing more
than a rescaling of the vertical axis. Such rescaling does not aﬀect the political support for
a bailout. To be more accurate the expected evolution of the representation ratios (that
are primarily driven by the state specific expected growth rates) should be considered,
with horizons given by the expected repayment stream of the federal debt.
11Following another vote related to the debt of Sao Paulo, a Senador of Santa Catarina
21
the session that led to the approval of the precedent-setting debt agreement
with São Paulo state when it reached the voting floor of the Brazilian Fed-
eral Senate in November 1997. They represented the state of Parana and
the Federal District. The theory presented predicts that these were exactly
the two most likely states to oppose a bailout at the time: they are iden-
tified by the crosses in Figure 2. These are the states furthest away from
the indiﬀerence line, i.e., those whose support for a bailout would be most
expensive to buy through compensating deals. States with such a locus are
the least likely to take part in a pro-bailout coalition as they do not benefit
from a bailout in either dimension: neither via debt relief nor via increased
income through constitutionally mandated transfers. The likelihood of two
randomly selected Senators belonging to the two most bailout adverse states
is just 0.46%. These states were also among the few that saw their contribu-
tion to federal revenues increase in the period 1997-2001.
The consideration of the RS arrangement gave correct predictions. More-
over these are fully consistent with the idea that rational politicians vote
individually in the best interest of their constituencies (which includes them-
selves) in all three bailout episodes. In the next section alternative explana-
tions are discussed.
commented: I did not oppose it so that people won’t say I am against governor Mario
Covas [of Sao Paulo].
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5 Alternative Explanations and Sensitivity
5.1 Was São Paulo "too big to fail"?
Some authors have argued that the state of São Paulo may have been too
large to fail. Models like Wildasin(1997) provide a theoretical underpin-
ning for such argument. This prediction is not unambiguous however. The
model of Sanguinetti and Tommasi(2004) for instance implies the contrary.
12 Furthermore it is often the case that small federation units are politically
overrepresented. 13 To address this concern, consider the alternative hypoth-
esis that it was common knowledge that a share of the debt of São Paulo
- of which part was owed to its arguably beleaguered state bank Banespa -
would have to be assumed by the federal government either way. Table 2
shows the proportion of the 27 states that would have been predicted by the
theory to oppose the 1997 bailout if we considered that all Senators took it
for granted that x% of São Paulo’s debt would have to be assumed by the
federal government. By taking the RS mechanism into consideration, the
opposition to a bailout decreases from between 21-24 to 6-7 states. Hence,
even if the state of São Paulo was widely perceived as being too large to fail,
we would still not have a plausible explanation for the approval of the general
bailout by the Senate.
12Wildasin’s model focuses on positive externalities produced by local public goods.
Sanguinetti and Tommasi emphasize that smaller units internalize a smaller fraction of
the cost, thus being more prone to overspending and bailouts.
13Seitz(1999) argues that, in Germany, two Laender were too small to fail in 1992.
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5.2 Partisan Considerations and Interest Groups
Another possible explanation for the observed pattern could in principle come
from the partisanship of elected governors. National parties may internalize
cross-state spillover eﬀects. Therefore, party discipline may have important
consequences in the discussion of wide ranging bailouts. However, it appears
unlikely that the partisan alignment was decisive in the case of Brazil. The
striking feature of the political process in Brazil is the lack of party loyalty
(see Rodden(2003b)). A recent event illustrates this: in September 2003, a
recommendation of the leadership of the main opposition party to oppose a
tax bill being proposed by the incoming government was largely ignored. 24
Senators voted yes and 26 no. Commenting on the outcome, the president of
the party explained that ...representatives responded to the appeals of state
governors, while a governor of the same party added that It is natural that
there is no unanimity. There are many regional aspects at play. 14 In the
case of the 1997 bailout mentioned earlier, the dissenting votes were cast by
representatives of opposing parties: one of the party of the federal government
(PSDB) and one of the main opposition party at the time (PT).
Still another possibility is that shifting state liabilities to the federal
sphere would bring benefits to bondholders. This would create incentives
for lobbying activities upon state representatives as analyzed in Grossman
and Helpman(2000). Such explanation however does not seem to apply to the
14Folha de Sao Paulo, Sept 2003.
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case highlighted in the preceding sections. First, if a bailout were the result
of lobbying activities, the cost minimizing strategy for lobbyists would be to
ensure a minimum winning coalition containing just 41 of the 81 Senators.
This was clearly not the case. Moreover, as the bailout carries considerable
cost for some states (direct debt transfers alone exceeded 10% of Brazil’s
GDP), incentives to expose such lobbying activities would be very strong.
Second, the point of this paper is that such lobbying activities or compensa-
tion payments would be redundant.
5.3 Revenue Sharing Avoidance
Another objection might come from the fact that not all federal revenues are
shared with states. This creates an incentive for the federal government to
tilt taxation towards non-shared taxes (which, arguably, are more distortive).
Indeed, members of the Constitutional Assembly had already thought of this
possibility and included an article that establishes that 20% of revenues of
any federal tax that was not previewed in the Constitution at the time of
enactment would be directed to the RS fund. This figure lies quite close to
the estimated value of μ (20.49%). The analysis presented was performed
under the assumption that states expected the central government to resort
to non-shared taxes in the future in the same proportion as it did at the time.
A sensitivity analysis reveals that the predicted support for a bailout would
still have assured a comfortable winning margin for bailout supporters even
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if μ were expected to be halved. A bailout would only be rejected if μ were
expected to fall below 7.8%. This was certainly not the case. Finally, the
formal specification assumed that increased federal debt service expenditures
have to be met by an increase in taxation. This assumption was made due
to downward rigidities in federal government expenditures, as the bulk of
federal tax revenues are earmarked for specific uses. Figure 3 shows that this
was in fact the case: contrary to the revenues of subnational governments,
federal revenues as a share of GDP did increase markedly between 96 and
99.
6 Concluding Remarks
There is more than simple debt transfer in a bailout when a RS mechanism is
in place. A federal RS mechanism might in principle scale back the amount
borrowed by states, since they anticipate costly transfers to other states in
case of a bailout. However, the political support for a bailout may increase
in the presence of RS, since the mechanism provides side payments to those
that would otherwise be the natural opponents of a bailout.
The paper provided evidence that this highly stylized model is consistent
with the observations in the Brazilian Federation. In particular, it ratio-
nalizes the approval of the state debt bailouts by the Brazilian Senate with
Senators individually maximizing the proceeds accruing to their political
constituencies. It could also explain the historical slackness of the Brazil-
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ian Senate borrowing authorizations without the necessity of vote trading.
Moreover, the mechanism is not plagued by the typical enforcement prob-
lems involved in vote trading. Indeed, the Constitution can be interpreted
as being the commitment device for side payments that are conditioned on
a bailout being approved.
By having a national constituency, the central government internalizes the
externalities induced by the expectation of a bailout. In principle, it could
try to induce states to more cooperative borrowing behavior. Arguably, this
has been done with the enactment of the Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal in
Brazil or the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Monetary Union.
To make no-bailout commitments time-consistent, controlling the level of
indebtness of federation units is not the only policy instrument however. As
suggested in Section 3, the distribution of state debt to the expected tax base
ratios and the ratio of the participation in RS to the share in taxable income
statistics could in principle be instrumental in curtailing political support
for a bailout. Specifically, one would like to have as many states as possible
within the boundaries of the "no bailout triangles".
An obvious way of eliminating the eﬀects of the side payments conditioned
on bailout is to make them unconditional by extending the coverage of RS so
as to include local tax revenues. It is important to note, however, that some
form of side payments conditioned on bailouts will always be present if local
and federal taxes are not shared at exactly the same rate (and do not apply
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to the same tax base).
The model of this paper is highly stylized and abstracted from a num-
ber of considerations focusing on redistributive aspects and emphasizing the
demand side for a bailout. The principles are general, however, and the con-
ditions derived are easily adaptable to evaluate the political support for a
bailout in any country with RS. The decision structure can be adapted to
country specific institutions. Local authorities might be weighted by the size
of their electorate (if bailout decisions are taken by politicians with national
constituencies) or the number of seats in the parliament.
A number of extensions could be possible. One that might be worth
considering is the case where the central government has its own incentives
to supply a bailout. Such extension would introduce strategic behavior and
moral hazard type considerations into the setting. Another line that might
be pursued would be to introduce a principal-agent problem. Shifting debt
to the federal level leads to an increase in overall taxation due to RS. If state
politicians obtain disproportional benefits from larger budgets, a bailout may
be a way of achieving over taxation relative to the preferred tax rate of voters.
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Table 1 % Participation % Constitutional Representation Amount
 FPE & FPM Transfers in State ratio Renegotiated 1997
1996  (A) Disposable Revenues 1996 (B) 1997-2001 (A)/(B) (% of State GDP)
Acre AC 2.00 86.1 0.06 0.05 34.70 0.00
Alagoas AL 3.26 54.4 0.33 0.24 9.86 0.00
Amazonas AM 2.04 22.0 1.25 1.09 1.63 1.17
Amapá AP 1.91 86.3 0.06 0.06 33.03 0.00
Bahia BA 9.03 29.9 2.25 2.12 4.01 2.77
Ceará CE 6.48 40.9 1.22 0.99 5.29 0.84
Distrito Federal DF 0.61 6.0 5.21 8.55 0.12 0.00
Espírito Santo ES 1.65 10.6 2.27 1.80 0.72 3.28
Goiás GO 3.30 18.4 1.04 0.97 3.17 7.57
Maranhão MA 5.61 65.0 0.40 0.30 13.96 2.89
Minas Gerais MG 8.68 8.4 6.86 5.50 1.26 15.95
Mato Grosso do Sul MS 1.46 18.8 0.36 0.28 4.12 9.78
Mato Grosso MT 2.12 22.0 0.43 0.38 4.88 9.65
Pará PA 4.87 46.2 0.68 0.55 7.13 1.56
Paraíba PB 4.02 53.4 0.45 0.37 8.90 4.43
Pernambuco PE 6.03 33.0 1.57 1.36 3.84 0.92
Piauí PI 3.43 62.3 0.31 0.22 11.08 6.23
Paraná PR 4.82 10.1 4.14 4.53 1.16 1.19
Rio de Janeiro RJ 2.38 3.1 14.55 15.39 0.16 9.81
Rio Grande do Norte RN 3.29 51.1 0.39 0.32 8.49 0.73
Rondônia RO 1.82 40.1 0.18 0.17 9.94 2.48
Roraima RR 1.39 84.9 0.04 0.05 33.65 0.63
Rio Grande do Sul RS 4.55 6.0 5.51 4.99 0.82 17.77
Santa Catarina SC 2.56 6.6 2.38 1.98 1.07 6.54
Sergipe SE 2.72 57.7 0.28 0.25 9.60 6.22
São Paulo SP 7.03 0.5 47.69 47.43 0.15 18.75
Tocantins TO 2.97 77.9 0.06 0.06 47.58 0.00
Sources: IBGE, Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, Secretaria de Receita Federal and Bevilaqua (2000).
Federal revenues collected by Secretaria de Receita Federal in 1996 amounted to R$ 91.7 billion (excludes Social Security and FGTS). 
R$ 18.8 billion were redistributed through FPE and FPM.
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Figure 2. Brazil: The 1997 Bailout
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Table 2 - Predicted proportion of states opposing a bailout (%)
without RS with RS
1989 blocked by 51.9% 25.9
1993 37.0 18.5
1997 blocked by 88.9% 25.9
Table 3 - Predicted proportion of states opposing a bailout (%)
 x without RS with RS
0 blocked by 88.9% 25.9
25 blocked by 88.9% 25.9
50 blocked by 77.8% 22.2
75 blocked by 77.8% 22.2
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Figure 3
Brazil: Tax Revenues (as % of national GDP)
Federal
SNGs
approx. 5% of tax revenues were not classified. Source: BNDES/SF. 
Appendix A. Brazil: The 1989 Bailout
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Appendix B. Brazil: The 1993 Bailout
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